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International Law 
STEVEN R. SWANSON 
In recent years, the oceans have become a venue for nontraditional 
uses such as rocket launches, fish farming, and energy production.  In 
2009, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted Google a 
patent for an ocean-based server farm, powered and cooled by the seas’ 
wind and water.  A server farm is simply a collection of computers joined 
together on a network providing services to remotely connected users.  
Google argued that the transportability of these server ships would allow 
easy movement to world regions where such services are needed.  In 
addition, the data center ship would provide a relatively green alternative 
to power-hungry server farms located on land.   
If these massive server farms populate the oceans, what regulatory 
schemes will apply?  The server ship’s owner may understandably seek the 
ability to avoid national exercises of jurisdiction.  Internet theorists have 
traditionally resisted state jurisdiction, arguing that cyberspace should 
provide its own norms.  This early view has recently been undercut by 
successful state exercises of control over various Internet players and the 
development of new technology allowing geographic segmentation of 
Internet content and use.  
This Article will consider and evaluate international law’s probable 
application to state jurisdiction over these server ships and other 
innovative technologies just beyond view.  It argues that the international 
community should resist additional abridgements of high seas freedoms to 
address issues relating to server ships or other new maritime uses, absent 
a compelling international need for additional regulation.  
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Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and 
International Law 
STEVEN R. SWANSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Internet pioneers saw a cyberworld free from national boundaries.  
Traditional notions of the nation-state system, with its dependence on 
territorial jurisdictional control, would simply become irrelevant in the 
online world, which could create its own norms to control unwanted 
Internet behavior without state-sovereignty restrictions.1  Unfortunately for 
these utopian theorists, the world’s nations had an entirely different vision, 
finding diverse ways to exercise power over the Internet game’s significant 
players.2  Although a particular website might not be subject to a state’s 
jurisdiction, the Internet service provider allowing local access to that site 
might be.  Companies providing search engines or financial transactions on 
the Internet might find themselves subject to local restrictions.  In addition, 
entities with property or personnel in the regulating country might be 
coerced into compliance.3  The Internet does not just exist in the ether; its 
physical manifestations exist within many countries, making cyberspace 
vulnerable to the state jurisdiction that Internet theorists had hoped to 
avoid.  
Even as the cyberworld has opened its doors, technology has 
multiplied the ways that human beings use the seas.  Plans are underway to 
build the nation’s first ocean-based wind farm off Rhode Island’s coast.4  
Fish farming in deep offshore waters is beginning to look like it may 
become economically feasible.5  Discussions are underway about how to 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, Yale Law School, LL.M., Vanderbilt 
University School of Law, J.D., Bowdoin College, A.B.  The author wishes to express his appreciation 
for the excellent research efforts of Maira Gavioli and the support and helpful comments from 
Professor Carol Swanson. 
1 See infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text. 
2 See infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
4 Deepwater Wind To Build First U.S. Ocean Wind Farm, CNET NEWS (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://msn-cnet.com.com/8301-11128_3-10413743-54.html?part=msn-cnet&subj=ns&tag=feed.  The 
wind farm will be made up of eight turbines providing twenty-eight megawatts of electricity.  Another 
facility has been planned off the coast of Massachusetts, but has been slowed by protests.  Id. 
5 See John McQuaid, In Search of New Waters, Fish Farming Moves Offshore, YALE ENV’T 360 
(Dec. 3, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2216 (reviewing recent attempts to create 
deep sea fish farms). 
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create livable settlements on the high seas.6  Russia is considering building 
floating nuclear power stations to power its arctic oil and gas exploration 
efforts.7  Spacecraft are even blasting off from the high seas.8 
Given these newfound maritime uses, it is not surprising that Internet 
stakeholders are looking to the seas as a place to locate, and perhaps 
protect, their businesses.  For example, in 2007, the owners of The Pirate 
Bay, a notorious Swedish illegal file-sharing operation, wanted to locate its 
servers on the Principality of Sealand, a self-declared independent state on 
a deserted British defense platform in the Atlantic Ocean.9  By locating its 
servers on this metallic “sovereign” nation, The Pirate Bay hoped to avoid 
national laws that prohibited its file-sharing service.10  Ultimately the deal 
fell through,11 but efforts persisted to isolate servers and the valuable 
information that they may contain.  
On February 26, 2007, Google filed for a U.S. patent on a “water-
based data center.”12  The patent application covered “a floating platform-
mounted computer data center comprising a plurality of computing units, a 
sea-based electrical generator in electrical connection with the plurality of 
computing units, and one or more sea-water cooling units for providing 
cooling to the plurality of computing units.”13  In layman’s terms, the 
patent sought to create container-based server units located on the water, 
powered and cooled by the ocean itself.  These units could be combined in 
multiple configurations and moved to new locations with relative ease.14   
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which 
produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
                                                                                                                          
6 See Ted Chamberlain, Future Sea Cities: Freedom’s Final Frontier in Pictures, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/05/photogalleries/seasteading-sea-
buildings-pictures/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (reporting on design contest for homesteads 
on the seas). 
7 John Vidal, Russia To Build Floating Arctic Nuclear Stations, OBSERVER, May 3, 2009, at 13 
(describing the Russian plan and environmentalists’ concerns). 
8 Sea Launch, partially owned by Boeing, is in the business of launching payloads from a sea-
based platform into equatorial orbit.  Cruising to Orbit: Why Sea Launch, SEA LAUNCH, 
http://www.sea-launch.com/why_sea_launch.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  The last launch of a 
satellite from the sea was a communications satellite on April 20, 2009.  Cruising to Orbit: History, 
SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sea-launch.com/history.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
9 Darren Murph, The Pirate Bay Eying Sealand To Escape Digital Persecution, ENGADGET (Jan. 
14, 2007, 8:45 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2007/01/14/the-pirate-bay-eying-sealand-to-escape-
digital-persecution.  The micro-nation had previously hosted HavenCo, which hosted gambling and 
other financial ventures seeking freedom from state jurisdiction.  Id.  For additional discussion of 
Sealand, see Kevin Fayle, Note, Sealand Ho! Music Pirates, Data Havens, and the Future of 
International Copyright Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 247, 260–63 (2005). 
10 See Murph, supra note 9 (“Sealand could be a potential sanctuary from the claws of the RIAA, 
MPAA, and other content ‘owners.’”).  
11 Jared Moya, The Pirate Bay Abandons Plans for a Sovereign Nation, ZERO PAID (Feb. 22, 
2007), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/8442/the_pirate_bay_abandons_plans_for_a_sovereign_nation. 
12 Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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(“UNCLOS”),15 met from 1973–1982.  Although the UNCLOS was 
successful in codifying and moving forward the international law of the 
sea, it did not anticipate the radical changes in sea usage that have 
subsequently occurred.  After all, the world’s oceans had been used for a 
limited number of purposes.  Transportation of goods and passengers and 
fishing were early traditional uses.16  Over time, navies plied the oceans in 
support of national goals, and communications cables ran across ocean 
floors.17  More recently, the seas have provided a source for the exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources and scientific study.18  The oceans 
have also served as a venue for human recreation.19  The UNCLOS’s 
provisions understandably attempted to provide an overarching set of 
norms to regulate these routine activities, but these provisions present an 
awkward framework for today’s myriad high-tech uses.  
This Article will explore the legal implications of an ocean-based 
server farm, beginning with a review of server farms’ unique problems and 
how Google’s approach may help to solve some of them.  The next 
segment will consider traditional international law rules relating to the 
state’s ability to prescribe conduct like the server farms envisioned under 
                                                                                                                          
15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].  To date, the United States has not ratified the convention, although it 
considers many of its provisions to be customary international law.  See Statement of President Reagan 
on United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 383, 383 (Mar. 10, 1983) (“[T]he 
convention also contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans which generally 
confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states.”).  The Obama 
administration has indicated that it will seek Senate approval of the treaty.  Ben Block, U.S. Leaders 
Support Law of the Sea Treaty, WORLDWATCH INST. (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.worldwatch.org/ 
node/5993. 
16 See, e.g., 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 2 (7th ed. 1985) (“In those days, a merchant would 
often travel by sea with his goods and merchandise, and sometimes there might be more than one such 
merchant in a ship.”).  Recent research shows that medieval fisherman plied the ocean waters as early 
as 1000 A.D., due to diminishing fresh water stocks.  Mark Kinver, Study Unlocks History of the Seas, 
BBC NEWS (May 24, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8058351.stm.  The origins of 
maritime law are quite ancient and can be found in nearly every culture.  In those days, maritime law 
was necessary to regulate trade and travel.  1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra, § 2 (“The practice of 
these seafarers and merchants gave rise to customary law.”). 
17 See, e.g., United States of America Statement in Right of Reply (Mar. 8, 1983), in 17 THIRD 
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICIAL RECORDS 243, 244 (1984) (“[A]ll States 
continue to enjoy in the zone traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines . . . .”).  The United States’ interpretation of UNCLOS recognizes 
laying of submarine cables and conducting military operations, exercises, and activities as 
“internationally lawful uses of the sea.”  Id.  
18 See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law Issues in 
Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservation and Management, 13 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 565–67 
(2001) (discussing the possibility of obtaining resources from deep sea vents); Mary Turnipseed et al., 
The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean 
Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4–7 
(2009) (discussing the dangers of exploitation of natural resources in the oceans). 
19 See, e.g., 10 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 1.01 (2009) (“[A]lthough only 11.3% of Americans 
have ever taken a cruise . . . 56% have expressed an interest in doing so in the next five years.”).  The 
cruise industry in the United States is currently a $12 billion per year business, with more than five 
million passengers per year.  Id.  
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the Google patent.  The Article will then review UNCLOS’s embodiment 
of the law of the sea to determine whether those rules adequately address 
unexpected issues presented by rapidly-changing technology, as informed 
by the analogous attempts to control pirate radio stations outside national 
jurisdiction.  In combating the pirate radio problem, the UNCLOS confers 
on states a right to arrest pirate radio vessels that contravene the exclusive 
flag state jurisdiction over its registered vessels.  When combined with the 
UNCLOS’s extension of state jurisdiction over large areas of traditional 
high seas, this suggests a willingness to undercut high seas freedoms that 
have long been the core of the law of the sea.  The Article concludes that 
the international legal community should be cautious about further limiting 
traditional notions of freedom of the sea in order to regulate these new 
maritime uses, particularly when there are less intrusive options. 
II.  SERVER FARMS CAST OFF 
A.  What Is a Server Farm? 
Put simply, a server is a computer designed to provide information or 
processes to other computers on a network,20 and a server farm, also 
known as a data center, is a group of servers in one location connected by a 
network.21  With the advent of cloud computing, the need for powerful 
remote storage facilities is bound to increase at a rapid rate.22  Cloud 
computing takes much of what was traditionally done on the local 
computer to remotely-located computer servers.23  In the past, the remote 
server would only be the information source; in the future, the cloud will 
likely run remotely-located applications, supplying the product to the local 
user.24  In addition, users are much more likely to store their data, or at 
least back it up, on the cloud.25  The growth of such applications and 
                                                                                                                          
20 Bradley Mitchell, Server, ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/basicnetworking 
concepts/g/network_servers.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (defining “server”). 
21 N. Madison, What Is a Server Farm?, WISEGEEK,  http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-server-
farm.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (outlining the basic features and purposes of server farms). 
22 LUIZ ANDRÉ BARROSO & URS HÖLZLE, THE DATACENTER AS A COMPUTER: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE DESIGN OF WAREHOUSE-SCALE MACHINES 1–5 (2009), 
http://www.morganclaypool.com/doi/abs/10.2200/S00193ED1V01Y200905CAC006 (featuring a 
discussion of two Google employees on the future of large scale server farms).  “[Cloud computing] 
refers to companies building massive computing power and then renting that capacity out to other 
firms.”  Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop in the Midwest, REDORBIT (May 7, 2008), 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/1374175/server_farms_becoming_a_cash_crop_in_the_mid
west. 
23 See BARROSO & HÖLZLE, supra note 22, at 1 (“Increasingly, computing and storage are moving 
from PC-like clients to large Internet services.”). 
24 See id. (“While early Internet services were mostly informational, today many Web 
applications offer services that previously resided in the client, including email, photo and video 
storage and office applications.”). 
25 See id. (“The shift toward server-side computing is driven primarily not only by the need for 
user experience improvements, such as ease of management (no configuration or backups needed) and 
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storage will, of course, require the creation of a greater number of large 
server farms.26 
B.  The Problem with Server Farms 
Server farms can be big, hot, power-guzzling, and ugly.27  Google’s 
Dalles Data Center will have a 75,000 square foot capacity.28  Microsoft’s 
San Antonio Data Center is 475,000 square feet,29 and Apple’s new data 
center in North Carolina is over 500,000 square feet.30  These examples 
present the tip of the iceberg.  Google has nineteen data centers in the 
United States, twelve in Europe, three in Asia, and one in South America.31  
In 2008, Microsoft was adding 10,000 servers a month.32 
Location is important to providing good service.  Long distances 
between servers, as well as between servers and individual users, slow 
delivery times.33  Unacceptable delivery times could kill the cloud 
computing concept; therefore, there is a need for server farms based 
broadly around the world. 
Running a data center requires cheap energy—and a lot of it.34  A large 
server farm can actually use as much power as a mid-sized city.35  
                                                                                                                          
ubiquity of access (a browser is all you need), but also by the advantages it offers to vendors.”). 
26 Apple has apparently recognized the need for such large server farms.  It is investing $1 billion 
in a server farm in North Carolina.  Erik Sherman, It’s Official: Apple To Build Massive Data Center, 
BNET (June 3, 2009), http://industry.bnet.com/technology/10002016/its-official-apple-to-build-
massive-data-center/948  (reporting on North Carolina legislature’s passage of tax relief measure to 
encourage Apple to build its facility in North Carolina).  Google has similarly received state support for 
the location of a server farm in North Carolina.  Id.  
27 See Stephanie N. Mehta, Behold the Server Farm, FORTUNE (July 28, 2006, 7:26 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/26/magazines/fortune/futureoftech_serverfarm.fortune/index.htm 
(describing the growth of large server farms). 
28 Matthew Wheeland, Google Data Center’s Massive Energy Appetite, GREENBIZ.COM (May 4, 
2009, 3:50 PM), http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2009/05/04/google-data-centers-massive-energy-
appetite (describing energy use at a Google facility). 
29 J. Nicholas Hoover, Inside Microsoft’s $550 Million Mega Data Centers, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(June 17, 2008), http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/data_centers/showArticle.jhtml? 
articleID=208403723 (describing Microsoft’s San Antonio Data Center). 
30 Rich Miller, First Look: Apple’s Massive iDataCenter, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Feb.  
22, 2010), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2010/02/22/first-look-apples-massive-
idatacenter. 
31 Map of All Google Data Center Locations, ROYAL PINGDOM (Apr. 11, 
2008), http://royal.pingdom.com/2008/04/11. 
32 Ina Fried, Microsoft’s Data Centers Growing by the Truckload, CNET NEWS (Aug. 20, 2008, 
7:28 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13860_3-10020902-56.html (outlining Microsoft’s server 
growth). 
33 Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop, supra note 22. 
34 See Cliff Kuang, Google To Take Its Servers to the High Seas?, FAST COMPANY (May 1, 2009), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/cliff-kuang/design-innovation/google-might-be-taking-its-servers-
high-seas (explaining Google’s floating data center patent). 
35 See Rachel Konrad, Server Farms on Hot Seat Amid Power Woes, CNET NEWS (May 14, 2001, 
11:20 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-257567.html (describing a server farm that would 
consume the same amount of energy as that needed to provide energy for all the homes in the city of 
Honolulu); Mehta, supra note 27 (discussing the immense amount of energy needed to construct a data 
center). 
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Understandably, many current farms are in areas that provide relatively 
inexpensive power.36  If low-cost energy is not readily available, the server 
farm may need to build power sub-stations.37  Although attempts have been 
made to make servers greener,38 power consumption remains a major 
concern.  Server farms produce a great deal of heat.39  Half of a typical data 
center’s energy consumption is used for cooling.40  Thus, developers try to 
locate server farms near rivers or lakes that can provide cooling for the 
facility at a relatively low cost.41 
Despite their overbearing size and power needs, Internet data centers 
still serve a crucial function in the development of cyberspace.  To the 
extent that the server ship concept may offer an alternative that is greener 
and more cost-effective, the development of such vessels could be a 
godsend for the industry. 
C.  The Google Patent 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office granted Google’s patent on a 
water-based data center on April 28, 2009.42  The data center would be 
made up of servers inside containers like those normally used for the 
carriage of goods by sea or rail.43  Cranes would place these containers on 
ships or barges.  The containers would be linked together to form large 
data centers that would be located at sea wherever necessary.44  Ocean 
waves, tides, or currents would supply power to these floating data  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
36 See Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop, supra note 22 (stating that Google has built server 
farms in “cheap-electricity locales”). 
 37 See, e.g., Rich Miller, RagingWire Builds Own Power Substation, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE 
(Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2007/01/29/ragingwire-builds-own-
power-substation (discussing the construction of a hosting company’s own power substation).  Google 
has even received permission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to act as a utility in 
buying and selling power.  Darren Murph, Google Gains Clearance To Buy and Sell Energy, Continue 
Taking over the World, ENGADGET (Feb. 19, 2010, 8:02 PM), http://www.engadget.com/ 
2010/02/19/google-gains-clearance-to-buy-and-sell-energy-continue-taking-o. 
38 For an entire website about green data centers, see GREEN DATA CENTER NEWS, 
http://www.greendatacenternews.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
39 Jane Anne Morris, The Energy Nightmare of Web Server Farms, SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION, 
Winter 2008, at 6, 6, available at http://www.greens.org/s-r/45/45-03.html. 
40 Id. 
41 See Mehta, supra note 27 (discussing how Microsoft began constructing a server farm close to 
hydroelectric power); Server Farms Becoming a Cash Crop, supra note 22 (“[S]erver farms typically 
require a good water source because the outposts often use water-cooled systems . . . rather than 
conventional air-conditioning.”). 
42 Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009).  
43 Id. at col. 3 ll. 13–23. 
44 Id. at col. 3 ll. 11–29.  The patent also purports to cover data centers on land that are powered 
and cooled in the same fashion.  Id. at col. 9 ll. 58–64. 
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centers,45 and pumping the surrounding water through an onboard system 
would cool them.46  
Figure 1 
Illustration from Google patent of ship with server containers on board, 
Pelamis machines providing power, and cooling provided by the water47 
 
 
In the patent application, Google noted the increasing need for global 
access to the Internet, with ever-expanding bandwidth expectations.48  This 
additional demand fed the need for localized data centers; after all, running 
long-distance connections to remotely-located server farms would be 
prohibitively costly, inefficient, and unworkable.49  In addition, Google 
noted that emergencies or military exercises could require establishing a 
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. at col. 1 ll. 57–65.  As an example, Google suggests that Pelamis machines could provide 
power.  Id. at col. 2 ll. 13–25.  These devices use wave energy to create electricity.  For more 
information, see the Pelamis Wave Power corporate website, http://www.pelamiswave.com (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011). 
46 ‘207 Patent at col. 2 ll. 1–6. 
47 Id. at fig.1B. 
48 Id. at col. 1 ll. 10–14. 
49 Id. at col. 1 ll. 24–30.  Google explains that it is best to locate these servers close to users.  
When this is done, data must only be sent once and network activity is limited and balanced.  Id. at col. 
1 ll. 31–38.     
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data center in a location that lacks adequate land-based facilities.50 
Thus, Google’s application emphasized cost, efficiency, and 
environmental friendliness as the reasons driving the need for water-based 
data centers.51  Some have suggested other motivations, however, such as 
the creation of data centers outside the jurisdictions of the countries that 
they serve.52  Google might do this to avoid, for example, China’s 
restrictions on search results leading to websites considered unacceptable 
to China’s ruling elite.  On the other hand, Google might be trying to create 
data centers storing sensitive materials to escape local laws, like The Pirate 
Bay’s attempt to use Sealand.  Roving server farms might also provide a 
desirable venue for typically heavily regulated industries, such as banking 
and credit card operations that want to escape local laws, including 
taxation.  Gambling or pornography websites could also escape scrutiny by 
running floating sites.  These purported freedoms would inescapably 
generate national jurisdictional claims with serious international legal and 
political implications. 
A website owner could theoretically be located anywhere in the world.  
For any number of reasons, a national government might want to eliminate 
access to that website within its national boundaries or at least control the 
allowed content.  Australia may want to allow its nationals to bring a libel 
suit in its courts regarding statements made on a U.S. website read in 
Australia.53  France will prohibit Nazi memorabilia being sold on a Yahoo! 
auction site from appearing in France.54  China wants to tightly control any 
content critical of the government or its policies.55  In fact, Google is 
currently struggling to comply with Chinese law.56  Effectively exercising 
jurisdiction over a website located halfway around the world is difficult. 
                                                                                                                          
50 Id. at col. 1 ll. 40–50.   
51 See id. at col. 1 ll. 10–50 (describing the advantages of a water-based data center).  
52 See Annalee Newitz, Server Farms of the High Seas, IO9 (Sept. 8, 2008), 
http://io9.com/5047017/server-farms-of-the-high-seas (questioning Google’s motives for the patent). 
53 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 147–48 (2006) (discussing an Australian case against the Wall Street Journal for 
alleged defamatory information on its website). 
54 See id. at 1–8 (discussing a French suit against Yahoo! to have Nazi items removed from its 
auction sites); see also Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 239–40, 247 (2008) (suggesting that proxy-blocking services and 
economic coercion would provide a temporary remedy for Chinese censorship). 
55 See Charles Li, Internet Content Control in China, INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y, Winter 
2003/2004, at 1, 5 (discussing Chinese attempts at Internet control). 
56 See Keith B. Richburg, China Renews Google’s License; Globe’s Biggest Online Market, 
WASH. POST, July 10, 2010, at A08 (reporting that Google’s discontinuance of its policy rerouting 
Chinese users to its Hong King site caused renewal of license to operate in China); Thomas Claburn, 
Google China Shutdown Almost Certain, INFO. WEEK (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.information 
week.com/news/software/open_source/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=223800260 (reporting that Google 
may shut down its operations in China because it has been unable to reach agreement with China 
regarding its censorship rules); Lara Farrar, Google-China Move Hurts Businesses, Academics, CNN 
(Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/03/23/china.google.impact/index.html 
(discussing the ramifications of Google’s departure from China).  
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That does not mean, however, that there is no way for a nation to 
control access to unwanted materials on the Internet.  One option would be 
to regulate the local user, but this piecemeal approach is likely to prove 
unwieldy, ineffective, and expensive.57  Going after individuals among 
millions of users does little to stop the overall flow of information.  Users 
are likely to rely on the statistical unlikelihood of being the targeted user.  
The use of libraries or Internet cafes also makes it more difficult to identify 
the real user.  A state may better be able to control Internet content by 
going after what Professors Goldsmith and Wu refer to as “Internet 
intermediaries.”58  Intermediaries could include Internet service providers, 
search engines, entities providing financial services, or domain name 
registry providers, and any state could go after any of these entities with 
personnel or property within its borders.59  Exercising control over a search 
engine provider could be a particularly effective way of restricting 
information access because the search engine is critical to deciphering the 
Internet’s enormous content.  Although it is probably impossible to remove 
all intermediaries from the local jurisdiction, one key link of the Internet 
chain could perhaps escape the state’s reach by moving offshore.  
Relocating the search engine to the open water could remove it from the 
state’s jurisdiction.  Because Google’s patent presumes the sea as a base 
for its activities, international law in general and the UNCLOS in particular 
provide the basic international law framework necessary to analyze 
possible jurisdiction over the server farms and other offshore activities.  
III.  GENERAL NOTIONS OF JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Ignoring for the moment that these data ships will be located on the 
seas, a review of international norms for the exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction should help focus the discussion.  In the Case of the S.S. Lotus, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice laid out the general principle 
for a state’s assertion of jurisdiction: 
Though it is true that in all systems of law the principle 
of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is 
equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law extend 
their action to offences committed outside the territory of the 
State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which vary 
from State to State.  The territoriality of criminal law, 
therefore, is not an absolute principle of international law and 
                                                                                                                          
57 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 70 (describing the difficulties that arise in Internet 
regulation when governments attempt to circumvent intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers). 
58 Goldsmith and Wu define these intermediaries as “the people, equipment, and services within 
national borders that enable local Internet users to consume the offending Internet communication.”  Id. 
at 68. 
59 Id. at 72–79. 
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by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty.60 
Thus, the state is not limited to its territorial boundaries in applying its 
laws internationally.  Nevertheless, boundaries do constrain how far a state 
can go, and these limits relate to the three primary types of jurisdiction.61  
Prescriptive jurisdiction provides the extent to which a state may make 
legal rules applicable to persons or activities.62  Adjudicative jurisdiction 
concerns the power of the state to force persons or property in its courts or 
other tribunals.63  Enforcement jurisdiction governs when a state may 
require compliance with its laws.64  This Article focuses on prescriptive 
and enforcement jurisdiction, which would be the primary focus of 
international concerns over a state’s attempt to exert authority over any 
new technology on the seas. 
According to the Restatement of the Law (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (“Restatement (Third)”), international 
law allows the state prescriptive jurisdiction over: 
(1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within its territory;  
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present 
within its territory;  
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to 
have substantial effect within its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its 
nationals outside as well as within its territory; and 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its 
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or 
against a limited class of other state interests.65 
The Restatement (Third) further limits the exercise of jurisdiction by 
requiring that it be reasonable in light of international comity concerns.66  
                                                                                                                          
60 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20 (Sept. 7). 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 
(1987). 
62 Id. § 401(a). 
63 Id. § 401(b). 
64 Id. § 401(c). 
65 Id. § 402; Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 
439, 439–40 (1935). 
66 The Restatement (Third) provides: 
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state 
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity 
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is 
unreasonable. 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is 
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:  
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to 
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In addition to these foundational principles of jurisdiction, any state may 
prescribe activities considered to be universal crimes, such as piracy, slave 
trade, aircraft attack or hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and certain 
specified acts of terrorism.67  The question is whether these general 
jurisdictional principles could support a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe the 
conduct of a server ship outside its territorial jurisdiction.  
A.  Territorial 
A state unquestionably possesses the right to exercise prescriptive 
jurisdiction over persons, locations, or activities within its territory.68  No 
sensible data center wishing to avoid the exercise of a particular state’s 
jurisdiction to prescribe would locate within the state’s territorial 
boundaries.  The remaining and related inquiry, however, is whether 
territorial jurisdiction might provide a basis for jurisdiction that reaches an 
outside-the-state server that connects with local computers inside the 
state’s territories.  In other areas, states have utilized the objective 
territorial principle to exercise jurisdiction over activities that occur outside 
the jurisdiction, so long as effects are felt within the state.69  The presence 
                                                                                                                          
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and 
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;  
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between 
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be 
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to 
protect; 
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to 
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the 
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the 
regulation; 
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system;  
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the 
international system;  
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity; and  
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise 
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in 
conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state’s 
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); 
a state should defer to the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987). 
67 Id. § 404 (allowing states to define and punish certain universal crimes). 
68 See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (finding that territorial 
jurisdiction is exclusive and absolute); see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 694 (2008) (reiterating 
the Schooner Exchange language). 
69 For example, the United States has a long history of exercising antitrust jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial acts having effects in the United States.  See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945).  For attempts to recognize international comity concerns to 
prevent overreaching by U.S. courts, see F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 
165–66 (2004); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979); 
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of a floating data center outside state territorial jurisdiction that allows a 
local to gamble or set up an offshore banking account may well create 
“effects” that could form the basis for prescriptive jurisdiction.  Even the 
ability to search for a site that offends the laws of the state could be seen as 
producing effects.  Under the Restatement (Third) standard, the server 
ship’s conduct could be considered to have or be intended to have, 
substantial effects within its territory.70  
B.  Nationality 
International law also allows states to prescribe the behavior of their 
nationals.71  Nationals are considered to owe an allegiance to their home 
country—and the state similarly retains an interest in its nationals—no 
matter where the national travels.72  In addition, a state is thought to be 
responsible internationally for its citizens’ actions, making worldwide 
jurisdiction appropriate.73  Thus, the United States criminalizes its citizens’ 
bribery of a foreign official anywhere on the globe.74   
Any state could pass laws applicable to nationals on board a domestic 
or foreign flag vessel ship.75  In addition, the coastal state could enact 
                                                                                                                          
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976).  But see Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993) (refusing to apply comity doctrine absent a true conflict 
between U.S. and foreign law).  See also Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of 
U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 6–21 (1992) (discussing the rules of statutory construction 
which allow federal courts to “establish the extraterritorial reach of federal law”); Steven R. Swanson, 
A Threshold Test for Validity: The Supreme Court Narrows the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 889, 908–15 (1991) (commenting on the diminishing role of international comity via 
limitations on the “act of state doctrine”).  The extent to which the European Court of Justice has 
adopted a form of the effects test has been a matter of some dispute.  See Joseph P. Griffin, EC and 
U.S. Extraterrritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 353, 355–59 (1994) 
(analyzing developments in extraterritorial jurisprudence).   
In the context of the law of the sea, the S.S. Lotus case stated: 
If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its effects on a vessel 
flying another flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must be applied as if 
the territories of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must 
therefore be drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to 
which the ship on which the effects of the offence have taken place belongs, from 
regarding the offence as having been committed in its territory and prosecuting, 
accordingly, the delinquent. 
The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7). 
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(a) 
(1987). 
71 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1932) (requiring a U.S. citizen residing 
in France to return to the United States to give testimony in a tax case). 
72 See Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal 
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE  J. INT’L L. 41, 67–70 (1992) (“In civil law and common law systems alike, 
nationality jurisdiction is normally justified by the theory that the national owes allegiance to the home 
state both while at home and while abroad.”). 
73 Id. at 68. 
74 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd)(1)–(3), (ff) (2006). 
75 See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting: A Test Case of 
the International System for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 71, 88 (1982) (“Where a person, corporation, vessel or aircraft has the nationality of a state, 
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legislation prohibiting its nationals from dealing with an offending 
vessel.76  These laws could attempt to regulate activities on the server ship 
in any number of ways.77  Of course, a vessel itself is considered to have 
the nationality of its flag jurisdiction, and the flag state may regulate its 
conduct anywhere in the world.78 
C.  Protective 
The Restatement (Third) indicates that a state may exercise jurisdiction 
under the protective principle.79  Although the extent of coverage has not 
always been clear, comment f attempts to define its parameters: 
f. The protective principle. . . . International law 
recognizes the right of a state to punish a limited class of 
offenses committed outside its territory by persons who are 
not its nationals—offenses directed against the security of the 
state or other offenses threatening the integrity of 
governmental functions that are generally recognized as 
crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., espionage, 
counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, falsification of 
official documents, as well as perjury before consular 
officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or 
customs laws.80 
Whether this provision would apply to a server ship would depend on 
what the vessel was doing.  The United States has used the principle to 
outlaw perjury committed before a government official abroad,81 to apply a 
statute extraterritorially that criminalized violent crimes in aid of 
racketeering,82 and to allow the boarding of vessels suspected of smuggling 
drugs without seeking the flag state’s permission.83  In addition, the 
protective principle has been used to justify environmental and anti-
terrorism legislation.84  If a server farm’s main purpose is to facilitate file-
sharing or Internet searches, it is unlikely that its activities would be 
                                                                                                                          
that state has jurisdiction to make rules governing the conduct of that person, corporation, vessel or 
aircraft.”). 
76 Id. 
77 See infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(3) 
(1987). 
80 Id. § 402 cmt. f. 
81 See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1968).  
82 See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 837 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 
1959 (2006) to the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Agency agent). 
83 See United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 933–34 (11th Cir. 1985).  
84 See MARIA GAVOUNELI, FUNCTIONAL JURISDICTION IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 31–32 (2007) 
(discussing how the protective principle establishes “the acknowledged basis of anti-terrorist 
protection”). 
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considered threatening to state security.  On the other hand, a server ship 
providing banking services that facilitate tax avoidance or containing 
sensitive national security information may implicate these sovereign 
national interests.  Protective jurisdiction might justify governmental acts 
to pursue pirate radio broadcasters because controlling the radio airwaves 
is considered an exclusively governmental function in European 
countries.85  This same exclusivity cannot likely be claimed for the Internet 
in general, a relatively unregulated wild west.86  Nevertheless, it is not 
difficult to imagine circumstances under which the regulation of 
extraterritorial servers might find justification under this principle. 
D.  Universal and Passive Personality 
Any state has the power to prescribe a relatively limited group of 
offenses that are considered by the international community to be of 
universal concern.87  Initially, covered crimes were limited to piracy and 
slave trading; over time, coverage expanded to include various acts of 
hijacking and terrorism, genocide, and some war crimes.88  Unless the 
server ship is involved in one of these prohibited activities, universal 
jurisdiction will not apply.   
Passive personality is a more controversial principle that supports state 
attempts to prescribe conduct that harms its nationals.89  Under this 
approach, the United States criminalizes taking U.S. citizens hostage 
outside the country90 and terrorist murders of U.S. citizens abroad.91  
Generally, passive personality does not reach ordinary crimes or civil 
wrongs; rather, the doctrine is triggered by public wrongs such as terrorist 
attacks or crimes against diplomatic representatives.92  Although it is 
possible to imagine a scenario in which a server farm could be utilized for 
serious misconduct of this sort, the principle’s real-world relevance in this 
context seems strained.  
 In the end, even if a traditional basis of prescriptive jurisdiction 
applies, the power to enforce that prescription may be far more 
challenging.  The UNCLOS provides the steps that the coastal state can 
                                                                                                                          
85 Robertson, supra note 75, at 87. 
86 Although the content of the Internet has been left primarily to its users, the United States has 
tried to maintain control over the Internet root authority.  For an interesting story of failed attempts to 
remove this control, see GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 29–46. 
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 
(1987). 
88 Id. § 404 & 404 cmt. a. 
89 Id. § 402 cmt. g. 
90 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006).  
91 Id. § 2332. 
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g 
(1987). 
 2011] GOOGLE SETS SAIL 725 
take against a vessel on the seas.93  The coastal state’s inability to enforce 
its prescriptions may undo any national laws regulating the server ship. 
IV.  THE LAW OF THE SEA 
The international law of the sea, as it exists today, is the product of a 
constant battle between freedom of the seas and state assertions of control 
over those waters.94  Although recognized as early as the Roman Civil 
Law,95 the freedom of the seas argument finds its intellectual origins in the 
writings of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in his Mare Liberum,96 which was 
published in 1608.97  The work grew out of a dispute over Portugal’s claim 
to exclusive trade with the East Indies.98  Grotius used natural law theory 
to argue that the sea is a common conduit for trade and communication 
among states and not subject to taking by the state for its own use.99  
Because no state can control something as vast as the oceans, a state’s 
jurisdiction should be limited to the area that it can control effectively.100 
                                                                                                                          
93 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at arts. 21, 25, 27, 28, 33, 56, 73, 77, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111.  
94 D.P. O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1982).  O’Connell argues that the 
balance between these themes has changed with the times: 
The tension between these has waxed and waned through the centuries, and has 
reflected the political, strategic, and economic circumstances of each particular age.  
When one or two great commercial powers have been dominant or have achieved 
parity of power, the emphasis in practice has lain upon the liberty of navigation and 
the immunity of shipping from local control; in such ages the seas have been viewed 
more as strategic than as economic areas of competition.  When, on the other hand, 
great powers have been in decline or have been unable to impose their wills on 
smaller States, or when an equilibrium of power has been attained between a 
multiplicity of States, the emphasis has lain on the protection and reservation of 
maritime resources, and consequently upon the assertion of local authority over the 
sea. 
Id. 
95 Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?, 64 A.F. L. REV. 1, 7, 18 (2009) 
(arguing for the extension of state sovereignty in cyberspace).  For a detailed discussion of the history 
of high seas freedoms, see generally PITMAN B. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN HISTORY, 
LAW, AND POLITICS (1924). 
96 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (Richard Haklyut trans., Liberty Fund 2004) (1608).  For an 
online English translation of this famous work, see HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 
(Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans.) (1608), http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option= 
com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=552&Itemid=27 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
97 O’CONNELL, supra note 94, at 10. 
98 Id. at 9.  Apparently, the dispute arose when a group of Dutch East India vessels captured a 
Portuguese merchant vessel.  Some saw the Dutch act as the equivalent of piracy, and Grotius was 
asked to write a defense of the Dutch acts.  He later edited his work, and Mare Liberum was published 
as a pamphlet in 1608.  Freedom of the Seas, YALE L. LIBR.—RARE BOOKS BLOG, 
http://blogs.law.yale.edu/blogs/rarebooks/archive/tags/Freedom+of+the+Seas+1609+exhibit/ 
default.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
99 See GEORGE V. GALDORISI & KEVIN R. VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. OCEANS POLICY 10 (1997) (“[N]o part of the sea can be considered as territory 
of any people whatsoever.”); O’CONNELL, supra note 94, at 9–10 (describing the “theory that the seas 
are avenues of commerce which of their nature are not susceptible of appropriation”). 
100 See GROTIUS, supra note 96, at 26–27 (providing a description of the sea as common 
property).  
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In response, English jurist John Selden published Mare Clausum in 
1635.101  Selden conceded that the earth had, at one point, been subject to 
common holding, but argued that God had allowed the division of the 
oceans and that man had accepted that separation through the social 
contract.102  He denied Grotius’s argument that the seas were too vast to 
control, saying that the oceans were as subject to delimitation as the land 
because the ocean resources were not without limits.103  According to 
Selden, by exercising dominion over the sea, the possessor may exclude all 
others.104   
In the end, Grotius’s free seas approach won out, mostly because the 
colonial powers needed unrestricted commerce with their far-reaching 
holdings.105  Coastal state jurisdiction was restricted to a thin band along 
the coastline, purportedly the distance that cannons could fire.106  The 
three-mile limit remained the rule until the middle of the twentieth century, 
when states sought greater control over maritime resources.107 
This push for greater state control over the oceans can be seen in the 
UNCLOS,108 which divides the seas into a number of different zones with 
                                                                                                                          
101 O’CONNELL, supra note 94, at 11 & n.61. 
102 Id. at 11. 
103 See POTTER, supra note 95, at 77 (supporting Selden’s conclusion that the “sea could be 
bounded as well as the land”). 
104 See id. at 72–73 (stating that, in Selden’s view, dominion over the sea is “a full title”). 
105 GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 99, at 10. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  The law of the sea continues to exhibit the tension between mare liberum and mare 
clausum.  The United States, as a major naval power and supporter of free trade, has long supported the 
freedom of the seas argument: 
The right to send ships across the oceans unimpeded by other states, subject only to 
limited exceptions in a coastal state’s maritime zones and even more limited 
exceptions on the high seas, has long been a centerpiece of U.S. policy.  The United 
States has been concerned for centuries with keeping the oceans open for trade and 
commerce.  Even before the United States was formed, American colonists stressed 
the importance of free navigation.  The United States, responding to attacks on 
commercial vessels, sent a permanent naval squadron to the Mediterranean in 1815 
to suppress pirates.  Furthermore, the United States has often emphasized the 
importance of international law in protecting neutral shipping during wartime.  
According to Professor Douglas Sylvester, the United States historically promoted 
“[n]eutrality, recast as a right of sovereignty under the law of nations, [as] the 
cornerstone of the system” of international commerce, a system to which the United 
States maintained an “ideological commitment.”  Preserving navigational freedoms 
was a major reason for U.S. participation in the War of 1812 and World War I.  As 
the U.S. Supreme Court said in 1947, the United States “throughout its existence has 
stood for freedom of the seas.” 
John E. Noyes, The United States, the Law of the Sea Convention, and Freedom of Navigation, 29 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (quoting Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword 
or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 86 
(1999)). 
108 See ARND BERNAERTS, BERNAERTS’ GUIDE TO THE 1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 102–03 (1988) (describing states’ interests in the UNCLOS); Bernard H. Oxman, 
The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 833–36 (2006) (discussing 
how the UNCLOS addresses the temptation to assign geographic boundaries and territories to the sea).  
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varying legal regimes.  In addition, the UNCLOS recognizes different 
actors with roles in this legal regime; the relevant primary actors are the 
flag state and the coastal state.109  International legal rules controlling a 
data center vessel’s actions on the seas will differ depending on the ship’s 
location and who is attempting to exercise jurisdiction.  For purposes of 
this discussion, one must assume that server ships could be found in any 
zone at various times, making it necessary to look at the legal regimes 
applying in each. 
A.  In the Zone 
Under the UNCLOS, the coastal state’s ability to enforce its laws on a 
foreign-flagged vessel depends on that vessel’s location.  The UNCLOS 
divides the seas into six zones: the internal waters, territorial seas, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, and high 
seas.110  A different legal regime would apply to a server vessel in each of 
these zones. 
1.  Internal Waters 
The UNCLOS provides only limited coverage to the internal waters 
inside the baselines drawn in accordance with the convention.  In the case 
of a relatively straight coast, the baseline is drawn on the low-water line of 
the coast.111  Where the coast is irregular, a baseline will be constructed 
using straight lines to join points along the coastline.112  These baselines 
are not allowed to diverge significantly from the “general direction of the 
coast,” and the waters inside the baselines must be “closely linked to the 
land domain.”113  The internal waters of the coastal state are those on the 
landward side of this baseline.114  These waters would include any portion 
of the sea, as well as lakes, rivers, and bays within the line.  For the 
exercise of jurisdiction, a nation has full territorial sovereignty over 
internal waters.115  In general, a server ship within a nation’s territorial 
sovereignty will be subject to that nation’s jurisdiction, both in terms of 
that country’s jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws.116  The 
                                                                                                                          
109 See UNCLOS, supra note 15, at arts. 2, 94 (describing the sovereignty and duties of coastal 
states and flag states, respectively). 
110 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 120 (2001).  
111 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 5. 
112 Id. at art. 7(1). 
113 Id. at art. 7(3). 
114 Id. at art. 8(1). 
115 BEDERMAN, supra note 110, at 120–21. 
116 See Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1, 19 (1886) (holding that every state has sovereign 
jurisdiction throughout its territory and has an interest in repressing crimes and offences within its 
territory); see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 223 (1963) (“A private ship in internal waters 
is, in principle, fully subject to the local jurisdiction, and the completeness of the coastal state’s right to 
exercise its jurisdiction in civil matters does not appear to be questioned.”). 
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UNCLOS contains one exception to this exclusive coastal state 
jurisdiction: where the application of straight baselines results in creating 
internal waters that were traditionally not considered internal, the right of 
innocent passage will apply.117 
International law does not require that foreign vessels be allowed in 
internal waters.118  Nevertheless, international ports are usually considered 
open to merchant vessels during times of peace.119  When a foreign vessel 
is in a coastal state port, both the flag state and the coastal state may claim 
competence to control behavior on the vessel.  Coastal states normally 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over matters having to do with the 
vessel’s internal workings120 unless the infraction disturbs the peace and 
tranquility of the port.121   
In all likelihood, a coastal state’s attempt to regulate the server ship 
would not relate solely to the vessel’s internal workings; as a result, the 
server ship faces the real probability of subjecting its primary function to 
local regulation.  Of course, this presumes a workable definition of internal 
workings, a concept that is less than clear.122  A vessel wishing to avoid 
state jurisdiction will want to steer clear of the internal waters. 
2.  Territorial Seas  
Although the law of the sea traditionally limited the state’s territorial 
jurisdiction to the distance that a cannon could fire—later defined as three 
nautical miles,123 the UNCLOS expanded the territorial seas to twelve 
miles from the baselines,124 and coastal states generally have sovereign 
rights over this area.125  The convention does, however, provide for the 
right of innocent passage,126 which allows ships continuous and 
                                                                                                                          
117 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 8(2).  For a discussion of innocent passage, see infra notes 
126–37 and accompanying text. 
118 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 111 (June 27) (stating that internal waters are “subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State”); 
LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1382 (5th ed. 2009). 
119 See BEDERMAN, supra note 110, at 121; DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 118, at 1382 . 
120 See Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 130 (2005) (“This Court has long 
held that general statutes are presumed to apply to conduct that takes place aboard a foreign-flag vessel 
in United States territory if the interests of the United States or its citizens, rather than interests internal 
to the ship, are at stake.”); Wildenhus, 120 U.S. at 12 (“[I]t would be beneficial to commerce if the 
local government would abstain from interfering with the internal discipline of the ship . . . .”). 
121 Wildenhus, 120 U.S. at 17. 
122 See Spector, 545 U.S. at 130 (discussing the conditions under which U.S. statutes apply to 
foreign-flag ships, a consideration that turns on whether the statute would regulate “the internal order 
and discipline of the vessel”). 
123 BERNAERTS, supra note 108, at 112. 
124 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 3. 
125 Id. at art. 2(1). 
126 Article 17 of the UNCLOS provides for innocent passage: “Subject to this Convention, ships 
of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea.”  Id. at art. 17. 
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expeditious passage through the coastal state’s territorial seas,127 so long as 
that passage is innocent.128  Passage is generally deemed innocent if it does 
not interfere with the “peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”129    
The UNCLOS lists activities that are not innocent.130  Most would be 
of little concern to the server ship, but a few could be construed as 
applying.  Article 19(2)(c) states that “any act aimed at collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State” 
is not innocent.131  Assuming that the data vessel limits itself to storing and 
transmitting information, it would be difficult to show that it is collecting 
information.132  Article 19(2)(d) could be more problematic; it provides 
that “any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of 
                                                                                                                          
127 Ships are allowed passage through the territorial sea under UNCLOS article 18: 
1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: 
(a) traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead 
or port facility outside internal waters; or 
(b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port 
facility. 
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious.  However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose 
of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress. 
Id. at art. 18 
128 UNCLOS article 19 defines what is considered innocent: 
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State.  Such passage shall take place in conformity with this 
Convention and with other rules of international law. 
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of 
the following activities: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of 
the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the 
coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal 
State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any 
other facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
Id. at art. 19. 
129 Id. at art. 19(1) 
130 Id. at art. 19(2)(a)–(l). 
131 Id. at art. 19(2)(c). 
132 Article 19(2)(j) also states that research and survey activities are not innocent.  The server 
vessel would not be likely to undertake such efforts.  Id. at art. 19(2). 
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the coastal State” would not be innocent.133  Information stored on and 
transmitted by the server ship could arguably constitute such propaganda. 
Article 19(2)(k) also presumes non-innocence for “any act aimed at 
interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or 
installations of the coastal State.”134  If a server hooks into the coastal 
state’s Internet, could that act amount to interference with that state’s 
systems of communication?  Although it seems likely that this provision 
was aimed at pirate radio or jamming devices, a state might argue that 
certain information or technology relating to the data ship could interfere 
with its system of communication.  For example, hackers might attack 
through the server ship.  If the state attempts to filter certain information 
from entering the country, the server ship might somehow interfere with 
that effort.  The UNCLOS drafters never had such scenarios in mind when 
drafting the convention;135 even so, these circumstances could yield an 
argument for interference with server ship activities.  Finally, the 
UNCLOS includes a catchall provision against “any other activity not 
having a direct bearing on passage.”136  It is easy to imagine a state making 
expansive arguments against innocence under this provision, and some 
have.137 
Of course, these innocence questions do not matter if the vessel is not 
in passage mode, moving continuously and expeditiously through the 
territorial waters.138  If either the transmission mode (cable or wireless) or 
energy production system requires the vessel to be stationary, the 
UNCLOS will likely not consider the ship’s travel through the territorial 
seas as passage.  The Google patent provides that the ship would be 
anchored while operating;139 thus, its anchored server farm would likely 
not be in passage. 
                                                                                                                          
133 Id. at art. 19(2)(d). 
134 Id. at art. 19(2)(k). 
135 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met from 1973–82.  The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), OCEANS AND LAW OF THE SEA 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2011).  Although a rudimentary form of the Internet was initially brought online in 
1969, its widespread use was not possible until the design of the World Wide Web in 1990 by Tim 
Berners-Lee, long after the completion of the UNCLOS process. Walt Howe, A Brief History of the 
Internet, WALTHOWE.COM, http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/history.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
136 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 19(2)(l). 
137 See GAVOUNELI, supra note 84, at 40 & n.60 (discussing expansive claims that environmental 
protection justifies a claim that passage is not innocent). 
138 It has been argued that ships cannot hover or cruise around the territorial sea, because, 
regardless of whether or not they are innocent, they would not be engaged in passage.  See R.R. 
CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 82 (1983) (noting how “coastal State jurisdiction is 
reserved in the case of ships lying in the territorial sea or passing through it after leaving internal 
waters”).  Nevertheless, ships may stop when there is a valid navigational reason to do so or required 
by force majeure, distress, or saving life or property.  UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 18(2). 
139 Water-Based Data Ctr., U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 col.1 ll. 57–62 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued 
Apr. 28, 2009). 
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For the most part, a ship doing anything more than efficiently 
transiting through the territorial sea should assume that it will be subject to 
the coastal state’s full jurisdiction.  If the server ship’s passage is non-
innocent, the coastal state has full jurisdiction over the vessel140 and “may 
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not 
innocent.”141  The convention does not clarify exactly what these steps 
might be.142 
3.  Contiguous Zone 
The UNCLOS codifies a contiguous zone outside the territorial sea 
that extends twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline.143  Within this 
zone, the coastal state can prevent or punish violations of its “customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or 
territorial sea.”144  The convention notably does not permit a coastal state 
to exercise jurisdiction in the contiguous zone for security violations.  
Although the waters in this zone are considered part of the high seas, states 
may still exercise limited jurisdiction.145  The data center vessel in the 
contiguous zone should not risk interference unless its actions will have a 
prohibited effect within the territory or territorial sea.  The most likely 
                                                                                                                          
140 GAVOUNELI, supra note 84, at 40. 
141 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 25(1). 
142 William K. Agyebeng, Theory in Search of Practice: The Right of Innocent Passage in the 
Territorial Sea, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 371, 384 (2006) (arguing that freedom of navigation should 
prevail over states’ claims for greater authority).  Article 21 of the UNCLOS does put limits on the 
types of restrictions that the coastal states can put on innocent passage: 
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the 
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to 
innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following: 
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; 
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or 
installations; 
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines; 
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; 
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the 
coastal State; 
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution thereof; 
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; 
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. 
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning 
or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted 
international rules or standards. 
3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted 
international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. 
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 21. 
143 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 33(2). 
144 Id. at art. 33(1)(a). 
145 DAMROSCH, supra note 118, at 1403. 
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danger would be violations of the state’s tax policy if the vessel is involved 
in offshore banking or illegal gambling activities which have an effect in 
the coastal state.  In such cases, the ship should assume that the coastal 
state would have jurisdiction over the vessel. 
4.  Exclusive Economic Zone 
Because the Google patent includes an energy production component, 
it could run afoul of UNCLOS provisions relating to the exclusive 
economic zone (“EEZ”).  The EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the 
coastal state’s baselines.146  These states have sovereign rights to exploit 
natural resources in the EEZ,147 an area covering about one-third of the 
world’s oceans.148  In particular, Article 56 states that the rights extend to 
“activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such 
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds.”149  
Although high seas freedoms are otherwise allowed in the EEZ, the coastal 
state’s sovereign rights over energy production would likely trump the data 
center ship’s need to manufacture its own electricity.  The coastal state 
could likely prevent the ship’s operation anywhere within the 200-mile 
EEZ.  On the other hand, if another method could be found for powering 
the ship’s electronics, its actions would provoke no resource issue, and the 
rules relating to the high seas would apply. 
In addition, the UNCLOS provides that the coastal state has exclusive 
rights to construct or authorize “installations and structures” for Article 56 
purposes in the EEZ.150  A data ship permanently anchored to the ocean 
                                                                                                                          
146 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 57. 
147 Id. at art. 56.  Article 56 outlines the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal State in the 
EEZ:  
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to 
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as 
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention 
with regard to: 
   (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
   (ii) marine scientific research; 
   (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the 
exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of 
this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be 
exercised in accordance with Part VI. 
Id. 
148 Oxman, supra note 108, at 839. 
149 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 56. 
150 Id. at art. 60.  Article 60 provides, in part: 
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floor might be considered such a structure, making it subject to the coastal 
state’s exclusive rights.  Given the coastal state’s exclusive control over 
energy production, it may not matter whether the anchored server ship is 
an Article 56 installation or a ship exercising its high seas freedoms.  In 
either case, it would be subject to state regulation.  Nevertheless, subject to 
these restrictions, all vessels retain the high seas freedoms otherwise 
provided for by the convention,151 including freedom of navigation.152 
5.  The Continental Shelf 
The UNCLOS gives the coastal state sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf “for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources.”153  The server ship outlined in the Google patent should not 
have any significant effect on these resources, making it unlikely that a 
coastal state could use this regime to regulate such a vessel. 
6.  The High Seas 
Assuming that the server ship is trying to avoid national jurisdiction, 
its best bet is likely to operate on the high seas.  Of course, doing this could 
undercut one of the goals of putting the data center in the water.  If the 
vessel operates 200 miles off the coast, it loses some of the benefit of 
                                                                                                                          
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right 
to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: 
(a) artificial islands; 
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and 
other economic purposes; 
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the 
rights of the coastal State in the zone. 
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, 
installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, 
health, safety and immigration laws and regulations. 
Id. 
151 Id. at art. 58. 
152 Id. at art. 87. Article 87 provides:  
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.  Freedom 
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and 
by other rules of international law.  It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-
locked States: 
(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under 
international law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the 
interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also 
with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the 
Area. 
Id. 
153 Id. at art. 77.  The UNCLOS contains a complicated set of rules for determining the extent of 
the coastal state’s jurisdiction over the continental shelf.  Id. at art. 76.   
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transportability.  The distance from ultimate users on land might become 
problematic; obviously, closer is better.  Even so, 200 miles is not a 
terribly long distance, and a vessel seeking to avoid jurisdiction may find it 
acceptable. 
The high seas are not as vast as they once were.  With the advent of a 
broader territorial sea,154 expanded notions of jurisdiction in the contiguous 
zone,155 extensions of sovereignty over economic resources in the EEZ156 
and on the continental shelf,157 and additional rights for archipelagic 
states,158 the remaining areas of high seas freedom have diminished.  
Article 87 retains the primary high seas freedoms, particularly freedom of 
navigation,159 and appears to provide no restrictions on the operation of a 
server ship.  Although the high seas legal regime is based on the ancient 
notion of mare liberum,160 that has its limits.  Article 87(2) requires that the 
high seas freedoms be exercised with “with due regard for the interests of 
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,”161 and 
Article 88 limits free seas usage to “peaceful purposes.”162  One can 
imagine a situation in which a data center vessel might be accused of 
operating with less than peaceful purposes.  In cases where the military is 
using its resources to conduct operations or hack the national security 
operations of the coastal state, there is no doubt that the server ship’s 
activities would be considered less than peaceful.  In most cases, however, 
a server ship’s operation would seem to fit within the UNCLOS’s spirit 
without violating its restrictions.163   
In the S.S. Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
stated: 
A corollary of the principle of the freedom of the seas is that 
a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the 
State the flag of which it flies, for, just as in its own territory, 
that State exercises its authority upon it, and no other State 
may do so.164 
                                                                                                                          
154 Id. at art. 3. 
155 Id. at art. 33. 
156 Id. at art. 56. 
157 Id. at arts. 76–77. 
158 Id. at arts. 46–54. 
159 Id. at art. 87. 
160 See The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826) (stating that the seas are “[a] 
common highway of all, appropriated to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or 
exclusive prerogative there”). 
161 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 87(2). 
162 Id. at art. 88. 
163 See Robertson, supra note 75, at 79 (addressing the same issue with regard to the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82). 
164 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7). 
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Ships plying the high seas are expected to fly a national flag,165 and the 
flag state generally exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel.166  
Under UNCLOS provisions, a server ship would have only one 
nationality;167 ships attempting to fly the two or more flags are accorded 
the same legal status as stateless vessels.168  If a ship appears to have no 
nationality, the navy of any state may board and assert jurisdiction.169  
Even when the vessel appropriately flies a flag, it may be boarded under 
limited circumstances such as when the ship engages in piracy or the slave 
trade, or illegally broadcasts into the coastal state.170  In addition, 
customary international law allows public vessels to stop any ship that 
constitutes a real threat to its national security or territorial integrity, 
                                                                                                                          
165 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 91. 
166 Article 92 provides: 
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases 
expressly provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject 
to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.  A ship may not change its flag during a 
voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or 
change of registry. 
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according 
to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to 
any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality. 
Id. at art. 92. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Article 110 of UNCLOS provides: 
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a 
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a ship entitled 
to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in 
boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the 
warship has jurisdiction under article 109; 
(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship. 
2. In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed to verify the 
ship’s right to fly its flag.  To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an 
officer to the suspected ship.  If suspicion remains after the documents have been 
checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be 
carried out with all possible consideration. 
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded 
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or 
damage that may have been sustained. 
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. 
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships or aircraft 
clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service. 
Id. at art. 110; see also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 
1982) (holding that any state may board a stateless vessel). 
170 UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 110.  For a full discussion of this issue, see Robert C.F. 
Reuland, Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the 
Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1161, 1229 (1989) (arguing 
that the exceptions to flag-state jurisdiction are “small chinks” in the general rule of exclusive flag-state 
jurisdiction).  
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subject to the limits imposed by self-defense, necessity, and 
proportionality.171 
Having a nationality actually protects the ship from other states’ 
jurisdiction and lets the flag state exercise diplomatic protection over the 
vessel under appropriate circumstances.172  Since random exercises of 
jurisdiction would undercut any of the goals attributed to the Google 
patent, the data center owner would be foolish not to seek flag state 
protection for its server ships.  
Because a server ship would need to have a nationality, it would likely 
seek a flag that best suits its interests.  Flag jurisdiction over shipping has 
created controversies in diverse contexts.173  Seeking a loose regulatory 
environment or lower taxes, ships seek registration in flag of convenience 
countries,174 such as Liberia, Honduras, the Bahamas, St. Vincent & the 
                                                                                                                          
171 See Reuland, supra note 170, at 1206–10 (discussing the state’s right of self-defense on the 
high seas). 
172 H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 90 (1967); Robertson, supra note 75, at 80. 
173 See BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 
1 (1962) (“This controversy [over flags of convenience] has assumed a variety of forms; there have 
been strikes, boycotts, and picketing in ports all over the world—legal battles in municipal courts and 
international assemblies—and even an appeal before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.”). 
174 H. Edwin Anderson III provides a concise history and description of flags of convenience: 
Historically, while vessels have been flagged or reflagged for one reason or 
another, most scholars trace the modern use of flags of convenience to the 1920s, the 
prohibition era of the United States.  During that time, several U.S. vessels, 
including two cruise liners, the M/V RELIANCE and the M/V RESOLUTE, were 
reflagged in Panama to avoid the U.S. law banning the sale of alcohol aboard U.S. 
ships. 
Since the 1920s, the amount of the world’s tonnage flying flags of convenience 
has steadily increased.  The latest United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) “Review of Maritime Transport” listed the top three 
shipowning nations as Greece (81.97 million dwt), Japan (80.3 million dwt), and the 
United States (55.1 million dwt).  Over half of the tonnage from these three nations 
are flying flags of convenience.  By all accounts, the trend in commercial shipping 
to fly flags of convenience is still increasing.   
The term “flag of convenience” has evolved to mean registration for primarily 
economic reasons in a country with an open registry.  Previously, the term 
contemplated registration for political reasons or to conceal criminal or questionable 
activities.  Today, however, the term is used commonly in a pejorative sense and 
indicates that a vessel owner, for one reason or another, does not want to create 
mutual obligations with a country with stricter standards for registration.  The 
current perspective on the definition of “flags of convenience” was concisely 
reflected in the Rochdale Report, published by the United Kingdom in 1970.  
According to the Report, there are six criteria for determining the status of “flag of 
convenience”: 
“[1] The country of registry allows ownership and/or control of its merchant 
vessels by non-citizens[;] 
[2] Access to the registry is easy; ship may usually be registered at a consulate 
abroad.  Equally important, transfer from the registry at the owner’s option is not 
restricted[;] 
[3] Taxes on the income from the ships are not levied locally, or are very low.  A 
registry fee and an annual fee, based on tonnage, are normally the only charges 
made.  A guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding future freedom from 
taxation may also be given[;] 
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Grenadines, Belize, or Panama,175 even when there is no real relationship 
between the vessel and the flag state.176   
A server ship’s purpose will often dictate the chosen flag.  If its goals 
are limited to those usually faced by the shipping industry—low regulation 
and cost—the server vessel may seek out one of the flag of convenience 
nationalities.  Other goals may suggest other possibilities.  A flag of 
convenience state may not have the power or political will to defend one of 
these vessels against another state’s violations of the server vessel’s flag 
state status.  In light of these vulnerabilities, a major naval power such as 
the United States offers more security as the flag nation.     
On the other hand, if the server ship seeks to avoid a particular 
country’s regulation, it will not want to fly that nation’s flag.  For example, 
a server ship trying to sidestep United States’ banking, gambling, or 
pornography laws would not fly a U.S. flag.  Another data center vessel 
may want to protect information on board from political repression in a 
particular country; for that reason, it will forego that country’s flag for one 
with a strong tradition of allowing and protecting political speech.  A 
server vessel that wants to protect delicate information from the world will 
want a state that champions the confidential nature of such information and 
is willing to defend it.  No one jurisdiction can be perfect under all 
circumstances; thus, the server ship owner should consider different flags 
for different vessels. 
If server ships are registered in countries that meet the vessel’s needs, 
will other states recognize those registrations?  Although the UNCLOS 
gives each state the right to determine its conditions for granting 
nationality to a vessel,177 it also provides that the flag state must have a 
                                                                                                                          
[4] The country of registry is a small power with no national requirement under 
any foreseeable circumstances for all the shipping registered, but receipts from very 
small charges on a large tonnage may produce a substantial effect on its national 
income and balance of payments[;] 
[5] Manning of ships by non-nationals is freely permitted[; and] 
[6] The country of registry has neither the power nor the administrative 
machinery effectively to impose any governmental or international regulations; nor 
has the country even the wish or the power to control the companies themselves.” 
H. Edwin Anderson III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and 
Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J.  139, 156–58 (1996) (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing 
Committee of Inquiry into Shipping: London, H.M.S.O. 1970, Cmnd 4337 [The Rochdale Report]). 
175 David Garfield Wilson, Interdiction on the High Seas: The Role and Authority of a Master in 
the Boarding and Searching of His Ship by Foreign Warships, 55 NAVAL L. REV. 157, 174–75 (2008). 
176 BOCZEK, supra note 173, at 2. 
177 Article 91 of the UNCLOS provides:  
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.  Ships have 
the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly.  There must exist a 
genuine link between the State and the ship. 
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag 
documents to that effect. 
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 91; see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584 (1953) (“Each 
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genuine link with the ship.178  Can a state refuse to recognize the vessel’s 
nationality when no genuine link exists?  In the M/V Saiga case, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea determined that the state 
could not;179 after all, the genuine link provision only exists to ensure that 
the flag state can exercise the UNCLOS-required control over the vessel.180   
The 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of 
Ships181 does little to clarify the situation.  Although that convention does 
better define what constitutes a genuine link, it lets the flag state determine 
whether to grant nationality to a vessel.182  The treaty does not suggest that 
another state can challenge the genuineness of the links; this limits its 
relevance in this context.  More importantly, the convention requires forty 
ratifications to come into force;183 to date, only fourteen nations have 
ratified.184  
Thus, neither the UNCLOS nor the Convention on Conditions for 
Registration of Ships prevents a data center ship from seeking a flag state 
that meets its needs.  Under current law, the best way to avoid interference 
with the ship’s operations would be to find a friendly flag state and operate 
on the high seas.  That flag state should have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the flag vessel and its activities, achieving the goal of removing the data 
center from other nations’ prying eyes and restrictions. 
B.  Pirate Radio 
In examining how the data center ship’s new technology might be 
treated outside normal sovereign control, the analogous situations 
                                                                                                                          
state under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its 
nationality to a merchant ship . . . .”). 
178 The concept of a genuine link comes from the Nottebohm case, in which the International 
Court of Justice determined that a state need not recognize another state’s granting of nationality to a 
person unless there is a genuine link between that person and the nationality-granting state.  Nottebohm 
Case (Liech. v. Guat.) (Second Phase), 1955 I.C.J. 5, 11 (Apr. 6). 
179 M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of Jan. 18, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 
1, 47. 
180 The Tribunal stated: 
The conclusion of the Tribunal is that the purpose of the provisions of the 
Convention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its flag State is to 
secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to 
establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a 
flag State may be challenged by other States. 
Id. at 42. 
181 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 
1229.  For further discussion of this convention, see Moira L. McConnell, “Business as Usual”: An 
Evaluation of the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 18 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 435 (1987).  
182 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, supra note 181, at art. 4. 
183 Id. at art. 19. 
184 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XII-7&chapter 
=12&lang=en (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (listing countries that have signed or ratified the convention). 
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involving pirate radio stations broadcasting into state territory from 
offshore is instructive.  Pirate radio saw its zenith in Europe in the mid-
1960s.185  In reaction to the sedate, state-owned-monopoly radio stations 
found in most of Europe, the pirate stations emulated mainstream 
American stations, playing rock with disc jockeys.186  By locating offshore, 
the pirate ships broadcasted in apparent violation of a tight-knit scheme of 
national, regional, and international regulations that divided bandwidth and 
often-protected state-owned stations from competition.187  Stopping these 
broadcasts proved difficult.188  Suggestions that the coastal state could 
exercise jurisdiction over these vessels were countered by the argument 
that the flag state enjoyed exclusive enforcement jurisdiction.189  In many 
cases, the broadcasters would take on a flag of convenience from a state 
with no ability or inclination to enforce restrictions on unauthorized 
broadcasting.190 
The 1965 European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts 
Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories (“European Pirate 
Radio Agreement”) requires that signatory flag states punish pirate 
broadcasters found on their own ships.191  Article 2 provides that each state 
criminalize pirate stations on its vessels and aircraft192 and make 
                                                                                                                          
185 See Robertson, supra note 75, at 75–76 (noting that the two most successful pirate radio 
stations in Europe during this time had “an audience of over 8,000,000 listeners”).  According to 
Robertson, the first pirate broadcasting began in the late 1950s and mostly ended by 1979.  Id. at 71. 
186 Id. at 72. 
187 Reuland, supra note 170, at 1224–25.  For additional discussion of pirate broadcasting and 
international law, see N. March Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in European Waters, 14 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 410, 410–20 (1965); Robertson, supra note 75, at 72–76; H.F. van Panhuys & Menno J. van Emde 
Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting: A Dutch Approach, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 303, 309–11 
(1966); Delbert D. Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CALIF. L. REV. 769, 769–72 (1968); Mitchell J. 
Hanna, Comment, Controlling “Pirate” Broadcasting, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1978). 
188 See Reuland, supra note 170, at 1225 (“Efforts to curb pirate radio have so far met with limited 
success.”). 
189 Id. 
190 See id. (“Often . . . the pirate broadcasting ship is registered to a state unable or simply 
unwilling to cooperate in the suppression of this activity.”). 
191 European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside 
National Territories arts. 2–3, opened for signature Jan. 22, 1965, 634 U.N.T.S. 239.  Article 1 
provides: 
This Agreement is concerned with broadcasting stations which are installed or 
maintained on board ships, aircraft, or any other floating or airborne objects and 
which, outside national territories, transmit broadcasts intended for reception or 
capable of being received, wholly or in part, within the territory of any Contracting 
Party, or which cause harmful interference to any radio-communication service 
operating under the authority of a Contracting Party in accordance with the Radio 
Regulations. 
Id. at art. 1. 
192 Article 2 provides, in part: “Each Contracting Party undertakes to take appropriate steps to 
make punishable as offences, in accordance with its domestic law, the establishment or operation of 
broadcasting stations referred to in Article 1, as well as acts of collaboration knowingly performed.” 
 Id. at art. 2(1). 
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collaboration illegal.193  Collaboration includes: 
a. the provision, maintenance or repairing of equipment; 
b. the provision of supplies; 
c. the provision of transport for, or the transporting of, 
persons, equipment or supplies; 
d. the ordering or production of material of any kind, 
including advertisements, to be broadcast; 
e. the provision of services concerning advertising for the 
benefit of the stations.194 
Article 3 then requires that each signatory apply the law to nationals on 
its “territory, ships, or aircraft” and outside its territories who violate the 
laws “on any ships, aircraft or any other floating or airborne object.”195  In 
addition, the state must apply the law to non-nationals “on its territory, 
ships or aircraft, or on board any floating or airborne object under its 
jurisdiction.”196  The agreement does not allow enforcement against a 
foreign flagged vessel, even if the flag state is a signatory.197 Thus, 
although the agreement creates an obligation to prescribe and enforce laws 
against private radio broadcasters and their collaborators under traditional 
jurisdictional notions, it does not expand the state’s jurisdiction to handle 
the pirate radio problem.  Nevertheless, the United Kingdom used such 
restrictions effectively against pirate radio stations transmitting into 
England.198 
The European Economic Community members brought the pirate radio 
broadcasts issue to the UNCLOS negotiations.199  Without opposition and 
little discussion, Article 109 was adopted,200 requiring that all states 
cooperate to suppress “unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas”201 
                                                                                                                          
193 Id. 
194 Id. at art. 2(2). 
195 Id. at art. 3(a). 
196 Id. at art. 3(b). 
197 Article 3, which contains the Convention’s application terms, makes no provision for 
enforcement on foreign flagged vessels, absent another traditional basis of jurisdiction.  Id. at art. 3. 
198 See Howard A. Bender, Note, The Case of the Sarah: A Testing Ground for the Regulation of 
Radio Piracy in the United States, 12 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 67, 88–89 (1988) (arguing that the United 
States should adopt legislation similar to the British law).  
199 Robertson, supra note 75, at 99. 
200 Id. at 99–100. 
201 Article 109 of the UNCLOS provides: 
1. All States shall cooperate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting 
from the high seas. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, “unauthorized broadcasting” means the 
transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on 
the high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international 
regulations, but excluding the transmission of distress calls. 
3. Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting may be prosecuted before 
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and allowing prosecution of such activities by the flag state, the state of 
registry, the state of which the violator is a national, the state receiving the 
unauthorized broadcast, or any state with which legitimate broadcasting is 
interrupted.202  These jurisdictional states may board, arrest, and prosecute 
the perpetrator and confiscate her equipment.203  This provision can be 
used against any UNCLOS party, currently 160 nations.204  
With the advent of satellite radio, the Internet, and other developing 
dissemination technologies, the need for tight control of unauthorized radio 
has lessened.205  Nevertheless, these provisions indicate how an 
international body might address the data ship problem. 
V.  SERVER SHIPS, CYBERLAW, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 The ocean-based server ship benefits Internet users, the Internet itself, 
the environment, and the vessel’s owner.  Internet users are always seeking 
more bandwidth, and the ability to move the server ship freely across 
previously unavailable expanses should decrease the distances that 
information must cross.206  More server farms could further increase the 
growth of cloud computing.207  In addition, emergency responders and 
military leaders will value the ability to provide computing power on 
site.208  More data centers, in previously untapped areas, will make the 
Internet a more effective medium for communication and world trade.  
Additional server farms will create new pathways through which 
information can flow, allowing for greater speed and reliability.209  These 
advantages will ultimately inure to the server ship owner, who will profit 
from the better service to customers and will also benefit from decreased 
                                                                                                                          
the court of: 
(a) the flag State of the ship; 
(b) the State of registry of the installation; 
(c) the State of which the person is a national; 
(d) any State where the transmissions can be received; or 
(e) any State where authorized radio communication is suffering interference. 
4. On the high seas, a State having jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 3 
may, in conformity with article 110, arrest any person or ship engaged in 
unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting apparatus. 
UNCLOS, supra note 15, at art. 109. 
202 Id. at art. 109(3). 
203 Id. at art. 109(4). 
204 These nations include convenience-flag states such as Liberia, Honduras, the Bahamas, St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines, Belize, and Panama.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src= 
UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#Participants (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011) (listing the parties to the UNCLOS). 
205 See Robertson, supra note 75, at 71−72 (noting that pirate radio filled a need not met by 
“existing broadcasting facilities” at the time of its peak in popularity).  
206 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. 
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energy costs for powering and cooling the servers. 
Apart from these practical advantages, the floating farms will also 
promote environmental efficiencies.  Perhaps the biggest land-based server 
problem has been the adverse environmental impact.  Data centers are 
energy hogs, producing tremendous amounts of heat.210  Using renewable 
power resources, such as the wind, waves, or tides, will greatly reduce the 
environmental impact of these servers.  The same can be said of using 
ocean waters to cool the servers. 
In general, traditional notions of prescriptive jurisdiction will allow 
coastal states to regulate the server ship’s activities.211  A territorial effects 
test should allow states to create the applicable norms.212  The information 
being sent into the receiving state would satisfy the effects requirement.213  
The state’s ability to regulate the conduct of its nationals or vessels 
provides another basis for effective prescriptive jurisdiction.214  
Enforcement presents more difficult questions.  Within the inland and 
territorial seas, these vessels should presume that the full force of the 
coastal state is available.215  With the exception of resource issues, such as 
energy production, the vessel should be able to exercise high seas freedoms 
in the EEZ and over the continental shelf.  In the contiguous zone, the 
coastal state can exercise jurisdiction to prevent violations of a limited 
group of laws in the territorial sea; rarely would a server ship be 
affected.216  Although a data center vessel on the high seas should be able 
to act independently of any jurisdiction other than its flag state,217 other 
states will be motivated to attempt regulation.   
Interesting similarities exist among these high seas rights and those 
espoused by some Internet law writers.  Rejection of territorial control was 
a central tenet of early Internet thinkers,218 who argued that the sheer 
                                                                                                                          
210 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 61–92 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
213 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 111–42 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 166–71 and accompanying text. 
218 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 13−14; Thomas Schultz, Carving up the Internet: 
Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
799, 802 (2008).  As Johnson and Post stated in their influential article: 
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant 
(online) phenomena and physical location.  The rise of the global computer network 
is destroying the link between geographical location and: (1) the power of local 
governments to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects of online behavior 
on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign’s efforts to regulate 
global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which 
sets of rules apply.  The Net thus radically subverts the system of rule-making based 
on borders between physical spaces, at least with respect to the claim that 
Cyberspace should naturally be governed by territorially defined rules. 
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number of transnational Internet communications would make it 
impossible for national governments to control them.219  The Internet’s 
very structure, with its ability to route communications around blocked or 
non-functional grid portions, would make it impossible for governments to 
interfere.220  Because the physical location of the machine providing the 
network is unimportant,221 some concluded that the Internet itself should 
provide its own governance, not subject to national jurisdiction.222  One 
influential Internet writer, John Barlow, relied on the natural law of the 
Internet, to create the often-cited Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants 
of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of 
Mind.  On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave 
us alone.  You are not welcome among us.  You have no 
sovereignty where we gather. 
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to 
have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that 
with which liberty itself always speaks.  I declare the global 
social space we are building to be naturally independent of 
the tyrannies you seek to impose on us.  You have no moral 
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of 
enforcement we have true reason to fear. 
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of 
the governed.  You have neither solicited nor received ours.  
We did not invite you.  You do not know us, nor do you 
know our world.  Cyberspace does not lie within your 
borders.  Do not think that you can build it, as though it were 
a public construction project.  You cannot.  It is an act of 
                                                                                                                          
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367, 1370 (1996). 
219 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 2; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 3 
(2006) (“The claim for cyberspace was not just that government would not regulate cyberspace—it was 
that government could not regulate cyberspace.  Cyberspace was, by nature, unavoidably free.”).  
Professor Lessig points out the inconsistency in relying on nature in this context: 
Nature.  Essence.  Innate.  The way things are.  This kind of rhetoric should raise 
suspicions in any context.  It should especially raise suspicion here.  If there is any 
place where nature has no rule, it is in cyberspace.  If there is any place that is 
constructed, cyberspace is it.  Yet the rhetoric of “essence” hides this 
constructedness.  It misleads our intuitions in dangerous ways. 
Id. at 31. 
220 GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 2–3. 
221 Johnson & Post, supra note 218, at 1370–71. 
222 Id. at 1387–91. 
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nature and it grows itself through our collective actions.223 
This idealistic optimism was soon met with a dose of reality.224  
Through technical Internet developments, the state is now able to 
determine the Internet user’s identity, location, and activities.225  Although 
the nation-state cannot likely control every Internet element, states can 
regulate intermediaries such as Internet service providers, search engines, 
financial providers, and even websites with property or people within the 
state, making it possible for the nation to exercise jurisdiction over these 
Internet choke points.226  After all, Internet service is simply not possible 
absent territorial contacts with the ultimate user.  State desire to control, 
along with technological developments allowing Internet providers to 
differentiate regional access, have created the expectation of compliance 
with local regulations.227  Of course, in many instances a state will lack the 
necessary connection to control Internet entities.228  Even so, the threat of 
control combined with the ability to tailor Internet content provides a 
powerful combination for the application of national norms. 
This ability to use coercive measures at certain links in the Internet 
chain may be part of what motivates Google to look to alternatives 
apparently beyond national reach.229  As discussed above, server ships 
                                                                                                                          
223 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
224 See Schultz, supra note 218, at 804 (describing the global response to online communication 
as from other countries as “a movement for cultural and nationalistic withdrawal”). 
225 See LESSIG, supra note 219, at 43–56 (describing the methods by which Internet users can be 
identified). 
226 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.  
227 Of course, there are those that resist this level of local control.  See, e.g., David G. Post, 
Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 883, 889–94 (2008) 
(describing competing theories regarding jurisdictional control over Internet content).  This Article 
takes no position on the wisdom of applying national laws to the Internet versus an Internet providing 
its own governance, only recognizing that current developments seem to establish that nations do have 
the ability to regulate many facets of cyberspace.  
228 See id. at 892 (quoting a professor who argues that for “almost all [Internet] users, there will be 
no threat of extraterritorial legal liability because of a lack of presence in the regulating jurisdictions”). 
229 Google’s recent dispute with China over Internet censorship, ending with Google closing down 
its China search engine, is but one example of the reasons why Google may wish to escape the bonds of 
national jurisdiction.  Google has rerouted traffic to its site in Hong Kong, which is not subject to 
censorship.  Elinor Mills, In Post-Google China, Censorship Is Unfazed, CNET NEWS (Mar. 26, 2010, 
4:14 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20001212-245.html. 
The author describes China’s sophisticated ability to stop undesirable Internet traffic: 
There are a handful of Internet access “choke points” in China, where all the 
traffic enters and exits to the outside world.  “All countries connect virtually all of 
their IP addresses through at most dozens of ISPs, but China’s network is the most 
centralized of any large country, with only four ISPs connecting more than 90 
percent of its IP addresses to the rest of the Internet,” Roberts said. 
The Great Firewall is the system of gateways, routers, and servers that China 
uses to keep objectionable content from reaching users inside the country.  
Authorities mirror the stream of traffic flowing into the domestic Internet and 
determine what portions of a Web page the government wants to block, Lih said. 
If the traffic is blocked at the domain name system level, users may get a “site 
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operating on the seas owe their duty of loyalty primarily to their flag state, 
a relationship with relatively little international regulation.230  Despite 
states’ efforts to assert national jurisdiction over greater parts of the seas, 
Grotius’s classic view of mare liberum continues to provide open access to 
important routes of international intercourse today.  Most of the world’s 
trade moves by ship.231  International rules allowing national interference 
over this crucial highway of commerce could have a detrimental effect on 
the global economy.  To the extent that the law of the sea expands the right 
of non-flag states to stop vessels, it could create a drag on trade; after all, 
the impressive expansion of global commerce since World War II, 
including development of national economies around the world, is 
undoubtedly due in no small part to the free movement of goods across the 
oceans.232  Today, the massive amounts of oil and natural gas moved by 
ships create a special concern for maintaining the unfettered flow of 
energy, a strategic resource.233  In addition, territorialization of the seas 
could limit access to a large portion of the earth’s surface, hindering 
research and development.  
The free movement of naval vessels is important to national and 
international security.  Although state jurisdiction may prove helpful in 
protecting coastal state security, it may collectively have a detrimental 
effect on international security arrangements.234  To the extent that U.S. 
and other naval vessels may be prohibited from crossing the seas, they may 
be less responsive in dealing with emergencies, including humanitarian 
missions, U.N. enforcement actions, and peacekeeping efforts.235  If denied 
access, more powerful nations may feel the need to use military force 
against assertions of national jurisdiction, leading to unnecessary 
                                                                                                                          
not found” message; if the IP address is blocked the message may say “site 
unreachable;” and if the URL is blocked or a page contains sensitive content a 
“connection reset error” message may be displayed, according to Lih. 
“China’s Great Firewall system is so sophisticated and massive, it can tailor 
blocking for each individual Web surfer because it monitors a person’s surfing 
activity to sites outside of China’s domestic Internet, right down to what’s contained 
inside the web page . . . .” 
Id. 
230 See supra notes 173–84 and accompanying text. 
231 The International Maritime Organization estimates that more than ninety percent of world 
trade moves by ship.  Int’l Maritime Org., Introduction to IMO, IMO.ORG, http://www.imo.org (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2011) (follow “ABOUT IMO” hyperlink). 
232 See S. Jayakumar, Keynote Address, in CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, FREEDOM OF 
SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 17, 18 (Myron H. Nordquist et 
al. eds., 2009) (“The navigational freedoms and passage rights which are guaranteed by  
UNCLOS have, in my view, underpinned this unprecedented period of global economic growth and 
prosperity . . . .”). 
233 See id. at 19 (“[N]avigational freedom is . . . vital to the energy security of States given that 
much of the world’s energy resources are transported around the globe by sea.”). 
234 See Oxman, supra note 108, at 840–41 (discussing the importance of global mobility as a 
means of responding to security threats). 
235 Id. 
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conflict.236 
The twentieth century saw the largest grab for national control of 
maritime territory since Grotius’s time.  The territorial sea, which was 
traditionally limited to the three-mile range of ancient cannon, grew to 
twelve miles in the UNCLOS.237  New entities for state control were 
created for the contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf.238  As one 
author explained: 
The territorial temptation thrust seaward with a speed and 
geographic scope that would be the envy of the most 
ambitious conquerors in human history.  The effective start of 
this process—President Truman’s claim to the continental 
shelf in 1945—was so quickly accepted and emulated by 
other coastal states that the emergence of the regime of the 
continental shelf, in derogation of the principle of mare 
liberum, has been cited as an example of instant customary 
law.  The Truman Proclamation unleashed a quarter-century 
of territorial and quasi-territorial claims to the high seas so 
vast that, at the dawn of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, the leader of the Canadian delegation, 
Ambassador J. Alan Beesley, could quip that he comes to 
bury Grotius, not to praise him.239 
By the century’s end, high sea freedoms, both in terms of territory and 
substance, had seriously declined.  One might argue that modern problems 
require this additional exercise of jurisdiction by coastal states.  
Establishing an EEZ will encourage the efficient utilization of resources.240  
Maritime pollution needs to be controlled.241  Radio pirates are a nuisance.  
On the other hand, does it make sense to address these complex challenges 
by expanding national jurisdiction over huge portions of the world’s 
waterways?  
How will the international community react to the new technologies 
that are venturing out onto the seas?  The reaction to pirate radio stations 
provides an intriguing clue.  The European Pirate Radio Agreement 
                                                                                                                          
236 Citing André Siegfried, Professor Dupuy notes that “wars took place to block maritime routes 
and political strategies attempted to protect them.”  RENÉ-JEAN DUPUY, THE LAW OF THE SEA: 
CURRENT PROBLEMS 9 (1974). 
237 See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
238 See supra notes 143–53 and accompanying text. 
239 Oxman, supra note 108, at 832 (footnotes omitted).  Another claims that following the 
UNCLOS, the “concept of the freedom of navigation has now become obsolete.”  Hasjim Djalal, 
Remarks on the Concept of “Freedom of Navigation”, in CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, 
supra note 232, at 65, 74. 
240 See DAMROSCH, supra note 118, at 1416–17 (describing how exclusive zones protect states’ 
interests in the viability of living resources in adjacent waters). 
241 UNCLOS pollution provisions can be found at Articles 217 through 233.  UNCLOS, supra 
note 15, at arts. 217–33.     
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provides that each signatory state agrees to criminalize certain behaviors 
under its own laws and enforce them against its citizens and vessels, using 
a traditional jurisdictional model for the prevention of pirate 
communications.242  Prescriptive jurisdiction will generally exist to 
regulate the abhorred conduct.  Although enforcement jurisdiction issues 
will continue to exist, the treaty recognizes that these can often be resolved 
by restricting the collaborators’ land-bound activities.243  By cutting the 
pirate station off from personnel, equipment, services, and supplies, the 
agreement makes it difficult for the pirate to continue her behavior.  
Punishing land-based advertisers makes a bad situation even worse by 
cutting off the pirate station’s financial lifeline.  Assuming the signatories’ 
good-faith compliance, the treaty provides an effective mechanism for 
controlling unauthorized radio communications.  The European Pirate 
Radio Agreement does this without curtailing high seas freedoms, making 
no attempt to provide the coastal state with additional zones of jurisdiction 
or undercut the flag states’ rights to exclusively control vessels of their 
own nationality.  The Europeans adopted a narrowly-tailored plan that was 
to address the specific issue that faced them without altering the basic 
tenets of the law of the sea.   
Article 109 of the UNCLOS takes a different tack.  Rather than leaving 
the enforcement of broadcasting laws to traditional notions of international 
jurisdiction, it allows any state receiving the unauthorized transmission or 
experiencing interference with its own legitimate broadcasts to arrest and 
seize persons or vessels on the high seas.  Article 109 does not require that 
the flag state give permission or even receive notice before enforcement 
actions are taken.244  This is a radical change in the notion of freedom of 
the seas.  Pirate radio stations are being treated in much the same way as 
piracy or the slave trade, even though the implicated issues are far less 
serious than these heinous crimes.  One author has questioned the wisdom 
of allowing additional state jurisdiction over pirate radio operators: 
[A]rticle 109 establishes a troubling precedent.  If the nations 
of the world, particularly those that regard themselves as 
guardians of the freedom of the seas, are willing to  
accept such a significant exception to the principle of the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over ships on the high 
seas on the basis of such weak justification to solve a largely 
nonexistent problem, other steadfastly held principles may be 
in similar jeopardy.  One can hope that article 109 does not 
represent a general trend away from exclusive flag-state 
                                                                                                                          
242 Supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction . . . .245  
Indeed, Article 109 has been cited as support for the general 
proposition that the international community is now willing to contravene 
mare liberum by extending national jurisdiction over vessels on the high 
seas.246  In the end, the jurisdiction provided to the coastal states constitutes 
a major diminution in high seas freedom, a freedom whose traditional 
exclusions had previously been limited to flag state jurisdiction, piracy, the 
slave trade, and self-defense.247 
Any extension of state jurisdiction over the ocean must balance the 
need for regulation against the benefits of preserving the traditional 
freedom of the seas.  If the threat is particularly dangerous, new 
international solutions may be needed.  Key issues such as marine 
pollution or preservation of world fishing stocks may provide a legitimate 
argument for some contravention of high seas freedoms.  Other problems, 
such as pirate radio, do not present the same level of danger to the world 
community.  High seas freedoms, and their related benefits, are far more 
compelling in the international context than any barriers created by 
exclusive flag state jurisdiction against enforcement of unauthorized 
broadcasting.  This is particularly true when one considers that the 
European Pirate Radio Agreement can effectively control the pirate radio 
problem without undercutting crucial international legal principles.  The 
agreement permits states to enforce their laws within their territories and 
on their ships, and they can pursue entities within their jurisdiction that 
support the outlawed activity, even when that activity falls outside the 
jurisdiction. 
To the extent these problems are caused by the flag system’s failure to 
provide reasonable rules for nationality and regulation of ships, these 
should be addressed.248  Strengthening genuine links requirements and 
enforcing the flag state’s regulatory obligations are a much more direct 
way of addressing the problems created by flags of convenience. 
It is impossible to foresee the future technologies that will find their 
way to the oceans.  Clearly, the Internet has had a much greater impact on 
the human condition than pirate radio stations ever did.  The next invention 
or discovery may be even more significant.  In any of these cases, the same 
analysis should apply.  Freedoms should be preserved unless an 
overwhelming need to curtail them outweighs the crucial trade and security 
interests protected by high seas freedoms.  In the pirate radio or server ship 
                                                                                                                          
245 Robertson, supra note 75, at 100. 
246 See, e.g., Christopher P. Mooradian, Note, Protecting “Sovereign Rights”: The Case for 
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situation, no such need exists because the state already has an effective 
mechanism for controlling local radio or Internet content through 
traditional jurisdictional means.  Now that Internet providers can identify 
where a user is located, the Internet has become more territorial in nature.  
A user doing a search in Europe will see very different results than those 
the same search produces in the United States.249  Moreover, the websites 
are likely to be in the user’s language,250 and the substantive content will 
be different, as well.251  The technology that allows such differentiation 
also permits a provider to create websites that comply with local laws, 
eliminating the likelihood of being pulled in different directions by diverse 
cultures and legal systems.252  No longer a unique entity, the Internet 
operates in the physical world, and like any business entity, a participant 
must comply with the countries’ laws where they do business.   
This new Internet also means that the local government can assert its 
own laws.  Internet access necessitates intermediaries who are subject to 
local jurisdiction.  There will be Internet service providers, search engines, 
advertisers, and merchants, all of whom may be subject to local 
jurisdiction.  These would be similar to the collaborators targeted by the 
European Pirate Radio Agreement.  To the extent that any one of these can 
escape the jurisdiction, others will still be subject to national regulation.  
Since other remedies already exist, there is no compelling policy for a 
derogation of high seas freedoms. 
Assuming that an extraordinary need for more dramatic action did 
exist, it is important to consider what standards should guide that response.  
Greater state control of the seas is not necessarily the best way to solve the 
international problems created by the Internet.  Ideally, global issues call 
for systemic solutions on a worldwide basis, as opposed to numerous, 
probably inconsistent, restrictions.  Even if individual coastal states enact 
regulations, they may lack the resources or will to protect the identified 
interest.  The extension of EEZ rights to coastal states, for example, has not 
effectively remedied over-fishing and resource utilization issues.253  In 
addition, it cannot be assumed that the coastal state will use its newfound 
power appropriately.  A nation lacking resources may be unable to enforce 
newly-acquired jurisdictional bases.  Another state with less than noble 
motivations may use its extended reach to harass shipping, making trade 
                                                                                                                          
249 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 53, at 61 (describing how technology allows Google to 
target ads geographically). 
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252 See id. at 58–60 (describing methods of online geographical identification). 
253 See Donna R. Christie, It Don’t Come EEZ: The Failure and Future of Coastal State Fisheries 
Management, 14 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2004) (discussing the continuing decline of EEZ 
fisheries stocks). 
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more difficult.  Finally, states may use legitimate extensions of jurisdiction 
as an excuse for ever-expanding claims for additional power.  These 
potential—and even likely—eventualities underscore the wisdom of 
protecting long-valued freedoms rather than pushing them aside to give 
states more options for local enforcement.  
The UNCLOS has given unprecedented control to the states, and 
Article 109 is a prime example of this unnecessary and undesirable 
cession.  By subjecting valuable international interests to greater state 
control, the convention is subverting hundreds of years of history to the 
coastal states’ relatively shortsighted demands.  Although it is hard to 
imagine reaching complete worldwide agreement on Internet content, new 
international mechanisms could still eventually be created to regulate 
agreed-upon core Internet principles.254  The primary issue is not the law of 
the sea, but the Internet’s content and control.  As a result, the resolution 
should not interfere with high seas freedoms.  For the most part, national 
rules can be enforced under current jurisdictional norms to reflect the 
needs of varying communities.  When they cannot, an international 
solution should be narrowly tailored so as not to undercut the longstanding 
premise of mare liberum.  High seas freedoms helped make global 
commerce the success it is today; a policy that advocates a lesser vision of 
ocean access would be a profound mistake. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since before the time of Grotius, a battle has raged between those who 
advocate high seas freedoms to facilitate international commerce and 
security and those who prefer to carve the oceans’ regions into separate 
fiefdoms.  The former view minimizes each individual nation’s control in 
favor of global systematic efficiencies; the latter puts a premium on state 
power at the expense of international cooperation.  For most of modern 
history, mare liberum has been the rule, but the twentieth century saw 
major encroachments on this notion.  The UNCLOS embodies many of 
these, extending coastal state jurisdiction to include a wider territorial sea, 
a contiguous zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf.  In addition, high 
seas freedoms have been minimized to deal with problems such as marine 
pollution and pirate radio stations.    
Today, technology is changing the face of commerce from moment to 
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moment, and undiscovered developments lie just beyond the horizon.  
Numerous new ideas for ocean use are at hand, including the notion that 
the seas would be an excellent location for movable server farms, powered 
and cooled by renewable ocean resources.  Portable and green, these server 
ships may attempt to avoid state control over the Internet, just as Internet 
pioneers saw cyberspace as a place free from traditional national norms.  
Nevertheless, as international networks have evolved, states have insisted 
that the Internet be responsive to local laws reflecting domestic concerns.  
The data center vessel might be an effective strategy to reclaim some of the 
freedom envisioned in earlier times. 
Although server ships could probably not avoid national jurisdiction to 
prescribe their behavior, enforcement could prove to be another matter.  A 
server ship operating under the high seas regime would most likely be 
exclusively subject to the flag state’s enforcement power; adversely 
affected states accordingly could not pursue violations of local laws.  In 
contrast, the UNCLOS specifically empowers injured coastal states to stop, 
search, and arrest vessels and personnel involved in illegal broadcasting.  
This provision presents a significant departure from the traditional high 
seas freedoms and the correlative policies that support them. 
Because these freedoms are so important to international trade and 
security, they should only be curtailed when a different international 
regulatory approach becomes absolutely necessary.  The harm created by 
these new technologies must be weighed against the benefits preserved by 
maintaining open oceans.  In the case of national regulation of server 
farms, the importance of the centuries-old mare liberum outweighs the 
need for states to exercise local control over server ships, particularly when 
the coastal state has other effective means for furthering its interests.  The 
Internet exists beyond the cloud; traditional jurisdictional principles should 
reach one or more of the requisite service links, including Internet service 
providers, search engines, advertisers, merchants, and the like.  Intrastate 
personnel or property of such intermediaries may also provide a basis for 
enforcement jurisdiction.  It may be possible for certain links to avoid local 
jurisdiction, but some intrastate presence is inevitable.  This will give the 
nation a legitimate foundation on which to enforce its own norms without 
undercutting age-old freedom of the seas principles. 
New uses for the seas should always take the same balanced approach.  
Before entertaining the idea of subverting high seas freedoms, the 
regulatory need should be weighed against the importance of these 
freedoms.  Assuming there is a need for action, the international 
community should be slow to grant additional state powers in derogation 
of mare liberum.  Instead, the international community should seek a 
conclusion that more pointedly addresses the issue without denigrating the 
highly-valued foundation of open-water access. 
